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Abstract 
Today’s public company executives face a considerably different set of opportunities and 
constraints than their counterparts from the managerial capitalism era, which reached its apex 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  The growing prominence of corporate governance played a 
significant role in this process.  This paper explores these developments, taking into account 
in so doing prominent corporate scandals occurring in the first half of the 1970s and early 
2000s, the 1980s “Deal Decade”, the “imperial” chief executive phenomenon and changes to 
the roles played by directors and shareholders of public companies. 
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Corporate governance encompasses the checks and balances affecting those who run 
companies.
1
  Issues that prompt corporate governance responses are endemic to the corporate 
form, particularly in a publicly traded company.  So long as this sort of firm lacks a dominant 
shareholder – the typical if not universal situation in large U.S. public companies since the 
mid-20
th
 century
2
 -- there is unlikely to be any one investor who has the wherewithal to keep 
executives in line.  Hence, for at least three-quarters of a century managerial “agency costs” 
generated by inattentive or self-serving executives have constituted the core governance risk 
in the U.S.
3
   
While corporate governance concerns might be endemic to the corporate form, the 
term “corporate governance”, while now ubiquitous, was largely unknown in the U.S. until 
the 1970s and the rest of world until the 1990s.  The basic chronology of the development of 
corporate governance from the 1970s onwards has been canvassed.
4
  There has been little 
                                                          
1
  Robert E. Wright, Corporation Nation (Philadelphia, 2014), 152. 
2
  Brian Cheffins and Steven Bank, “Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?”, Business 
History Review 83 (2009):  443, 455-58.  
3
  Ibid., pp. 443-44.  The pioneering work on managerial agency costs was Michael C. 
Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976):  305. 
4
  See, for example, Brian R. Cheffins, “Introduction” in Brian R. Cheffins, ed., The 
History of Modern U.S. Corporate Governance (Cheltenham, 2011), ix; Brian R. Cheffins, 
“The History of Corporate Governance”, in Mike Wright, Donald Siegel, Kevin Keasey and 
Igor Filatotchev, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (Oxford, 2013), 46.  
On corporate governance developments in the U.S. prior to the term’s deployment see 
2 
 
work done, however, on why events unfolded in the manner they did.  Conceivably the lack 
of analysis could be because nothing more was going on than the adoption of a handy catch 
phrase encompassing already familiar topics and themes.  In fact, the new terminology was 
accompanied by a reconfiguration of governance arrangements in U.S. public companies.  
These important changes coincided with and were related to the demise of a “managerial 
capitalism” era that reached its apex in the U.S. during the middle of the 20th century.  This 
paper correspondingly considers how and why corporate governance moved to the forefront 
in the manner it did as well as identifying the implications for executives, directors and 
shareholders of public companies.    
Some factors that account for the emergence and subsequent prominence of corporate 
governance have in fact been identified.  For instance, various observers have noted that 
reaction to and analysis of corporate scandals occurring during the first half of the 1970s 
helped to lift the phrase “corporate governance” from linguistic obscurity and that egregious 
misbehavior affecting companies such as Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s served to 
“lock in” corporate governance institutionally by prompting a concerted regulatory response.5  
Similarly, it has been acknowledged that dramatic growth in the proportion of shares owned 
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by institutional shareholders as the 20
th
 century drew to a close helped to put corporate 
governance on the map.
6
   
This paper will focus on additional, largely unexplored, factors that contributed to the 
growing prominence of corporate governance.  Particular emphasis will be placed on market 
and regulatory trends affecting the opportunity set of senior executives of public companies.  
Despite neither boards nor shareholders – staples of corporate governance discourse – 
providing meaningful oversight of executives during the managerial capitalism era, it was 
relatively rare for executives to engage in the sort of misbehavior that could jeopardize, at 
least in the short term, the future of their companies.  Various factors that constrained 
executives in the 1950s and 1960s, such as “boring” banking, union power and robust 
industry-level regulation, would be displaced or reconfigured in ensuing decades in a manner 
that simultaneously expanded the managerial options available to executives and increased 
the potential magnitude of agency costs.  As the managerial capitalism era drew to a close, 
corporate governance, primarily in the form of more active boards and shareholders, 
introduced a substitute set of checks and balances.  These failed to preclude the rise of the 
“imperial CEO” in U.S. public companies or corporate calamities such as Enron and 
WorldCom.  Corporate governance-related checks and balances became more robust, 
however, in the wake of the corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the 2008-09 financial 
crisis.  This could mean that for the foreseeable future the managerial agency cost problem 
will not be as acute as it has typically been since the end of managerial capitalism era.   
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Governance in the Managerial Capitalism Era 
According to distinguished business historian Alfred Chandler there was during the 
late 19
th
 century and the opening decades of the 20
th
 century a “managerial revolution” where 
a growing division between ownership and control was accompanied by the flourishing of 
sophisticated managerial hierarchies and the development of an increasingly professional 
ethos among senior executives of large corporations.
7
  A by-product was that in the decades 
immediately following World War II “managerial capitalism” prevailed in the United States, 
at least among large business enterprises.
8
  A hallmark of managerial capitalism was that it 
was the norm for large public companies to lack dominant shareholders capable of and 
motivated to impose meaningful checks on top executives.  What Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means referred to in their famous 1932 book The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
as a separation of ownership and control correspondingly became the “core fissure” in U.S. 
corporate governance.
9
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  Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand:  The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Cambridge MA, 1977), 9, 484; Alfred D. Chandler, “The Competitive Performance 
of U.S. Industrial Enterprises since the Second World War,” Business History Review, 68 
(1994):  1, 14. 
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During the “heyday” of managerialism10 there was awareness that the “core fissure” 
affecting public companies gave rise to risks of managerial misbehavior.  As economist 
Edward Mason said in 1959, the “independence of corporate management from any well-
defined responsibility to anyone carries with it the possibilities of abuse….”11  Theoretically, 
the shareholders in widely held firms prepared to act collectively could have used their right 
to elect the directors and other shareholder powers to keep executives in check but the 
prospects for shareholder activism were bleak because retail investors lacking both the 
appetite and aptitude to intervene in corporate affairs collectively owned most of the shares.
12
  
Advocates of shareholder democracy such as Lewis Gilbert received substantial newspaper 
coverage but the shareholder democracy movement was “small” (if “loud”) and was facing 
“rather astounding obstacles.”13 
Boards of directors also theoretically could have reduced “the possibilities of abuse”.  
For instance, Robert Gordon, in his 1945 book Business Leadership in the Large Corporation 
said boards structured to be independent of management should function as “management 
auditors” that reported on a corporation’s progress and the quality of its leadership, reasoning 
that such an arrangement would “provide in good part the check on decision-making officials 
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1465, 1511.  
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  Edward S. Mason, “Introduction”, in Edward S. Mason ed., The Corporation in 
Modern Society (Cambridge, MA, 1959), 1, 11.   
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which is now too frequently lacking.”14  During the 1950s and 1960s, however, boards were 
ill-suited to scrutinize executives.  The chairman of an Eastern manufacturer was quoted in a 
1960 Wall Street Journal article on a trend in favor of appointment of “outside” (non-
executive) directors as saying “Too many boards still meet in secret so that they can pass all 
of the resolutions at once, and spend most of the time talking about shooting, fishing, and 
women.”15  A 1968 study of directors said it was unwise “to assume all is well at the 
corporate pinnacle”, citing “outside-director absenteeism, one-hour or even briefer regular 
sessions, and not-too-frequent meetings.”16  Likewise, Myles Mace reported in 1971 that 
boards of public companies rarely asked discerning questions or engaged in meaningful 
measurement of executive performance and would only contemplate dismissing the chief 
executive officer (CEO) in the event of a crisis.
17
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given that neither shareholders nor boards were likely to 
impose meaningful checks on executives, there were instances of egregious managerial 
misbehavior during the managerial capitalism era.  In the mid-1950s financier Lowell Birrell 
used complex corporate merger transactions as a platform to loot a dozen corporate treasuries 
of millions of dollars before fleeing to Cuba.
18
  In the late 1950s, Earl Belle, a youthful 
                                                          
14
  Robert A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation (Berkeley, 1945), 
347. 
15
  Richard F. Janssen, “Working Directors”, Wall Street Journal, November 30, 1960, 1.   
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director of publicly traded Cornucopia Gold Mines, engaged in share price manipulation to 
increase the company’s share price before absconding to Brazil with nearly $1 million in 
company funds.
19
  Edward Gilbert, after relying on family backing to gain control of 
hardwood manufacturers E.L. Bruce & Co., stole in 1962 $2 million from the corporate till 
and fled to Brazil when a bid to acquire a larger company foundered.
20
  Less obvious 
managerial opportunism took the form of perks such as lavish corporate headquarters, 
executive airplanes and ill-advised managerial empire-building, most notably a 1960s trend in 
favor of diversification by merger exemplified by the creation of sprawling conglomerates 
such as International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT), Gulf & Western and Litton Industries.
21
  
While neither boards nor shareholders were doing much to keep executives in check 
during the heyday of managerial capitalism and while there were examples of managerial 
misbehavior there was little appetite for substantial change to the governance arrangements of 
public companies.  The Dean of Yale Law School said of large public companies in 1959 that 
“enlightened lay opinion could be summarized in these terms”: 
“Yes, there are paradoxes and anomalies in the ways boards of directors are elected in 
some large, publicly-held companies.  But what of it?...(M)ost boards of directors are 
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  George P. Baker and George David Smith, The New Financial Capitalists:  Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts and the Creation of Corporate Value (Cambridge, 1998) 14-17. 
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not so bad.  Business seems energetic…All in all, the system may be illogical, but it 
works.”22  
Corporate success does much to explain the perception that the system “worked”.  When 
World War II ended, the U.S. experienced a prolonged economic boom, most leading 
corporations grew rapidly and, as an incidental by-product, shareholders did well.
23
   
Confidence that, aside from a few “pirates” and “buccaneers”,24 top executives were 
unlikely to take improper personal advantage of their positions reinforced the belief that the 
system “worked”.  A 1965 study of institutional shareholders that specifically cited the 
examples of Birrell, Belle and Gilbert to make the point there was a need for checks on 
executives nevertheless indicated “The vast majority of professional managers are 
undoubtedly faithful to the responsibilities imposed by their stewardship.”25  With 
conglomerate mergers, while a divestiture wave in the 1980s provided strong evidence that 
many were misguided,
26
 perceptions were different when the deal-making was occurring.  
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Economic Performance in the United States and Germany (Oxford, 2000), 105-7; Ira M. 
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Thomas Clarke (ed.), Corporate Governance:  Critical Perspectives on Business and 
Management (Abingdon, U.K., 2005), 263, 271. 
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  Baum and Stiles, Silent, p. 7.   
26
  Baker and Smith, New Financial, p. 17. 
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During the late 1960s Harold Geneen, head of ITT, was acclaimed as the greatest 
businessman of his time.
27
  More generally, the conglomerate was thought of as a superior 
organizational structure, benefitting from reduced risk due to diversification and functioning 
as an internal capital market that supposedly could allocate capital more swiftly and adeptly 
among divisions than the market could.
28
   
Even Adolf Berle, having identified the separation of ownership and control in public 
companies as a potentially serious problem in 1932, acknowledged during the managerial 
capitalism era that things had worked out better than he feared.  He observed in 1959 that 
“The principles and practice of big business” were “considerably more responsible, more 
perceptive and (in plain English) more honest than they were in 1929.”29  Likewise he said in 
1962 that serious corporate scandals were “happily, rare” and acknowledged that conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders likely were less pronounced three decades after 
the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property even though increasingly 
diffuse share ownership meant the separation of ownership and control had become more 
acute.
30
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  Robert Sobel, The Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings (New York, 1984), 127.  
28
  Mark J. Roe, “From Antitrust to Corporation Governance?  The Corporation and the 
Law:  1959-1994” in Carl Kaysen, ed., The American Corporation Today (New York, 1996), 
102, 109-10; Brian Cheffins and John Armour, “The Eclipse of Private Equity”, Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 33 (2008):  1, 30. 
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  Adolf A. Berle, “Foreword” in Edward S. Mason, ed., The Corporation in Modern 
Society (Cambridge, MA, 1959), ix, xiii. 
30
  Adolf A. Berle, “Modern Functions of the Corporate System”, Columbia Law Review, 
62 (1962):  433, 437, 438, n. 9.   
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Given the weak checks shareholders and boards imposed on executives, why did “the 
possibilities of abuse” not translate into more of the sort of misbehavior that would 
subsequently prompt calls for corporate governance reform?  The nature of corporate 
leadership prevalent during the managerial capitalism era likely played a significant role.  
The prototypical executive of this era was a bureaucratically-oriented “organization man” 
who subordinated personal aspirations to foster the pursuit of corporate goals.
31
  The chief 
executive functioned not as a charismatic leader but as an industrial statesman well suited to 
accommodating a wide range of constituencies that included regulators and politicians.
32
  
CEOs were in turn cornerstones of “a moderate, pragmatic corporate elite…based primarily 
in the largest American corporations.”33   
Various factors helped to keep top management on the straight and narrow during the 
managerial capitalism era.  Development of common values of duty, honesty, service and 
responsibility for oneself under the testing conditions of the Great Depression and World War 
                                                          
31
  Amanda Bennett, The Death of the Organization Man (New York, 1990), 13-14.  The 
term “organization man” was coined in this context by William Whyte:  The Organization 
Man (New York, 1956).   
32
  Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands:  The Social Transformation of 
American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession 
(Princeton, N.J., 2007), 205-6, 355; Robert Reich, Supercapitalism:  the Battle for 
Democracy in an Age of Big Business (New York, 2007), 45-46.   
33
  Mark S. Mizruchi, The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite (Cambridge MA, 
2013), 43. 
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II likely contributed to a sense of moral restraint among mid-20
th
 century executives.
34
  
Restrictions on access to finance helped to keep managerial ambition in check, with 
commercial banks experiencing an era of “boring” banking due to tight regulation and with 
investment banks having a partnership-based organizational structure where personal liability 
of partners discouraged risk-taking in the form of adventurous financing of companies.
35
  
Organized labor was a force to be reckoned with in many industries and executives, fearful of 
debilitating lengthy strikes, frequently agreed to changes to work rules that could limit 
significantly their managerial prerogatives.
36
  Federal securities laws introduced in the mid-
1930s also may have had a role to play.  David Skeel, in a 2005 book where he drew upon the 
Greek myth of the ill-fated Icarus to characterize as “Icaran” historically noteworthy U.S. 
executives who took bold and ultimately ill-advised risks, said disclosure obligations federal 
securities regulation introduced made it “much harder for an Icaran entrepreneur to disguise 
what he was doing and take desperate gambles.”37     
                                                          
34
  Tom Brokaw, The Greatest Generation (New York, 1998); Robert Sobel, The Great 
Boom:  How a Generation of Americans Created the World’s Most Prosperous Society (New 
York, 2000), 48-50, 127-28.    
35
  See Mizruchi, Fracturing, p. 136; Brian R. Cheffins, “The Corporate Governance 
Movement, Banks and the Financial Crisis”, (2015) 16 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 1, 19-
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36
  Mizruchi, Fracturing, pp. 98-110; Eli Ginzberg and George Vojta, Beyond Human 
Scale:  The Large Corporation at Risk (New York, 1985), 79-80, 85-86. 
37
  David Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom:  The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate 
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Market structure imposed a final significant check on executive overreach during the 
managerial capitalism era.  Oligopolistic arrangements prevailed in many industries due to a 
dearth of foreign competition and what amounted to a “managed national economy” where 
regulators were dictating prices and enforcing standards in telecommunications, transport, 
utilities and other key sectors.
38
  The insulation market power provided from competition 
fostered among top executives of dominant firms a bias to hold a steady course as long as 
possible.
39
  This likely stored up trouble because the circumspect executives of companies 
that were dominant during the managerial capitalism era were probably failing to treat cost 
reduction, the changing needs of customers and product innovation as sufficiently high 
priorities.
40
  On the other hand, with corporate culture favoring bureaucrats over 
entrepreneurial dissenters, Icaran executives prone to taking bold risks that could jeopardize 
the future of their companies if things went wrong were unlikely to move to the forefront.
41
  
The author of a 1963 book entitled The Managed Economy even suggested “(t)he individual 
entrepreneur has disappeared from all but marginal areas of enterprise.”42   
The Cracks Begin to Appear 
A management consultant, writing in 1996, characterized the business environment of 
the 1950s in the following terms: 
                                                          
38
  Khurana, From Higher, p. 206; Reich, Supercapitalism, p. 47. 
39
  Ginzberg and Vojta, Beyond, pp. 136-37.  
40
  Baker and Smith, New Financial, p. 12. 
41
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42
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“There was easy access to cheap raw materials, the cost of money was low and stable, 
and the major markets of the world were cut off from each other by poor 
communications and expensive distribution.  A reasonably well-made product was 
always able to find a ready market, so that the producer could easily charge more than 
its costs and make a profit.  And constant growth covered up most of our mistakes.  It 
was indeed rather difficult to fail.”43 
Matters changed as the 1960s turned into the 1970s.  Meaningful foreign competition 
emerged for the first time in decades and the margin for error was reduced further for U.S. 
companies because resources relied upon for production were becoming increasingly scare 
and more expensive.
44
  Early casualties of these changing conditions would set the scene for 
both for initial regular usage of “corporate governance” terminology and increased emphasis 
on governance mechanisms largely ignored during the heyday of managerial capitalism.  
Railways, to a greater extent than firms in many other industries, were put under 
intense competitive pressure in the 1950s and 1960s as airlines expanded and highway 
construction flourished.
45
  The Pennsylvania Railroad remained sufficiently on track to keep 
intact its record of more than a century’s worth of uninterrupted dividends but its fate was 
sealed by a disastrous 1968 defensive merger with the New York Central.
46
  Penn Central 
was a “management mess”, with a chairman of the board who was more interested in real 
                                                          
43
  Mike Davidson, The Transformation of Management (Boston, 1996), 55-56.     
44
  Ibid., pp. 59-62. 
45
  Robert Sobel, When Giants Stumble (Paramus, N.J., 1999), 199-200.  
46
  Joseph R. Daughen and Peter Binzen, The Wreck of the Penn Central (Boston, 1971), 
256.  
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estate holdings acquired as part of a diversification plan than in railways, a president who was 
ignored and railway foul-ups and misroutings.
47
  The Penn Central directors were asleep at 
the switch throughout,
48
 with one admitting that the board was little more than a “rubber 
stamp” and a “horrible example”.49  In what was characterized as “the most spectacular case 
of corporate mismanagement in recent history” 50 Penn Central became in 1970 what at that 
time the largest bankruptcy in history.
51
 
Though Penn Central’s problems were particularly egregious impropriety was in no 
way restricted to the troubled railway.  By 1976 the Watergate Special Prosecutor’s Office 
had successfully prosecuted nearly twenty companies for violating campaign finance laws, 
meaning the infamous Watergate scandal shook public confidence in the business community 
as well as politicians.
52
  Dozens of U.S. public corporations, motivated at least partly by fears 
of losing business to aggressive competitors,
53
 made illegal or questionable foreign payments 
                                                          
47
  Sobel, When Giants, p. 208. 
48
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Forbes, July 15, 1970, 18. 
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50
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51
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52
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American Business (New York, 1976), 17. 
53
  “The Global Costs of Bribery”, Business Week, March 15, 1976, 22.  
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during the first half of the 1970s.
54
  In many of these companies one or more members of 
senior management knew of or approved the illicit practices but the outside directors were 
uniformly ignorant of what was going on.
55
  This represented, according to the federal 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), “frustration of our system of corporate 
accountability”56 that would help to put corporate governance in the spotlight.   
Corporate Governance Comes on to the Agenda 
The Penn Central bankruptcy and the revelations of corporate corruption brought 
corporate governance on to the official reform agenda in the mid-1970s.  The SEC attacked 
on various fronts what it considered to be negligence in the boardroom.  These included the 
launching of proceedings against three of Penn Central’s outside directors in 197457 and the 
resolving of numerous foreign corrupt practices cases by settling proceedings on the basis the 
companies would make board-level changes, such as the appointment of additional outside 
directors and the creation of an audit committee.
58
  In addition, due to SEC prodding, the 
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  Summarized in in Lester A. Sobel (ed.), Corruption in Business (New York, 1977), 
150-55.  
55
  Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street:  A History of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance, (Boston, 1982), 537. 
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  Ibid., 542. 
57
  “A New, Sterner Standard”, Business Week, May 11, 1974, 158; B.E. Calame and 
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58
  A.A. Sommer, “The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance”, Law and 
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16 
 
New York Stock Exchange amended its listing requirements in 1977 to require each listed 
company’s board to have an audit committee composed of directors independent of 
management.
59
  The same year the Commission also held six weeks’ worth of public hearings 
to examine “shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process and corporate 
governance generally.”60   
Harold Williams, chairman of the SEC, warned as the 1977 hearings got underway 
that if public companies did not upgrade managerial accountability voluntarily the result 
could be “a watershed shift toward governmental control and policing of the corporate 
governance process.”61  Ultimately a 1980 SEC staff report based on the hearings refrained 
from recommending legal reform concerning board structure or related issues.
62
  Others, 
however, were proposing corporate governance-related legislation.  In 1980, Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum, having previously appointed a “blue-ribbon” advisory committee on corporate 
governance in his capacity as chairman of a congressional sub-committee, introduced to 
Congress the Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act.63  This draft legislation contained 
provisions mandating an independent director majority on boards, requiring the establishment 
                                                          
59
  Burt Schorr, “Corporate Directors Scored for Lax Scrutiny of Managements’ Acts”, 
Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1978, 1.  
60
  Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Report on Corporate Accountability 
(Washington, 1980), Forward, 1-2. 
61
  “Corporate Governance – New Heat on Outside Directors?”, Business Week, October 
1, 1977, 33.  
62
  Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff, p. 34. 
63
  S. 2567, 96
th
 Congress, 2d Sess., 126 Congressional Record S3754.   
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of audit and nomination committees made up exclusively of independent directors and giving 
shareholders novel rights to nominate candidates for election to the board of directors.
64
  
These were also features of the Corporate Democracy Act of 1980,
65
 introduced to Congress 
by Representative Benjamin Rosenthal, which was designed to reform the governance 
structure of corporations so they would act in more democratic and accountable ways.
66
   
Corporate governance was not merely a topic of interest in Washington.  Use of the 
term “corporate governance” in newspapers and academic journals began in earnest in the 
late 1970s (Fig. 1).  The American Bar Association and the Business Roundtable, an 
association of CEOs of leading U.S. firms, acknowledged in separate reports in 1976 and 
1978 respectively that boards of public companies should typically have a majority of outside 
directors and should establish audit, compensation and nomination committees outside 
directors dominated.
67
  The American Law Institute (ALI), the mission of which is to 
undertake projects to clarify and modernize areas of the law, committed itself in principle in 
1978 to address corporate governance.
68
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Figure 1:  “Corporate governance” Hits in Newspapers/Academic Journals in JSTOR 
database, 1958-93 
   
Sources:  ProQuest Historical Newspapers Database; JSTOR
69
 
The U.S. was a “first mover” with the corporate governance nomenclature.  The term 
only came into general usage elsewhere in the 1990s, even in Britain, the corporate 
governance deliberations of which would turn out to be influential globally in that decade.
70
  
Crucially, the change in the U.S. was not merely terminological.  Instead, the debates about 
corporate governance reflected a new approach to the challenges managerial accountability 
(or lack thereof) might pose.  Given that neither boards nor shareholders were well-situated to 
intervene, during the 1950s and 1960s little store could be placed realistically in mechanisms 
                                                          
69
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associated with corporations as a means of restraining the executives in charge.  Instead, 
constraints would have to be external, whether in the form of law, public opinion or market 
forces.
71
  Matters changed in the 1970s.  There was a shift in emphasis in favor of reforming 
corporate decision-making processes,
72
 with advocates of corporate governance reform 
treating the board of directors as a potentially meaningful and beneficial constraint on 
wayward executives.
73
   
Though theoretically shareholders can take steps to keep management in line, they 
were an afterthought in most fledgling discussions of “corporate self-governance”.74  For 
instance, a prominent New York corporate lawyer suggested in 1982 that “the stockholder’s 
role” was unlikely “to change greatly during the lifetime of the corporate governance reform 
                                                          
71
  See, for example, Dow Votaw, Modern Corporations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), 
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Governance” in George C. Grenias and Duane Windsor, eds., The Changing Boardroom 
(Houston, 1982), 1, 11.   
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and Windsor, Changing, 128, 132.   
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  On the terminology, see Robert S. Hatfield, “The Changing Corporate Environment:  
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debate.”75   Even those who approved of shareholder democracy in theory acknowledged the 
obstacles created by retail investor domination of share ownership.
76
  In fact, shareholders 
would begin to move into the corporate governance spotlight during the 1980s, to which we 
turn next.    
The Deal Decade 
As the 1980s got underway, there was evidence the flurry of interest in corporate 
governance occurring in the 1970s might be subsiding.  While coverage in academic journals 
(primarily law reviews)
77
 continued to expand, newspaper reporting tailed off (Fig. 1).  A 
political shift to the right, exemplified by Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election to the presidency, 
effectively foreclosed the possibility of federal legislative reform and aggressive SEC 
intervention.
78
  The ALI continued with its corporate governance project but, in the face of 
opposition from the business community and law school academics examining corporate law 
from a new, market-friendly “law and economics” perspective, quickly backed away from 
proposals to endorse mandatory rules concerning board structure.
79
  Corporate governance, 
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77
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however, would not be on the ropes for long.  Instead, a takeover wave the U.S. experienced 
in the 1980s would set the stage for it to develop further over ensuing decades.   
In the 1980s, known as “the Deal Decade”,80 putative acquirors of companies relied 
on aggressive, innovative financial and legal techniques to offer generous premiums to 
shareholders of a wide range of target companies to secure voting control.  Takeover bids can 
be a potent “external” governance mechanism because incumbent managers will be 
motivated to keep their corporation’s share price up to foreclose the possibility of 
intervention by an unwelcome bidder anticipating that displacing an underperforming 
management team will generate sufficient additional value to justify proceeding.
81
  
Takeovers, by motivating executives to focus on shareholder returns, can direct the behavior 
of management in the same way as “internal” corporate governance mechanisms such as 
monitoring by boards, shareholder activism and executive compensation structured to align 
pay with performance.
82
  Correspondingly, if the hostile takeover activity occurring during 
the 1980s had become a permanent feature of the corporate landscape this could have 
rendered internal governance mechanisms largely superfluous.  In fact, the Deal Decade, and 
in particular its demise, helped to foster interest in corporate governance.   
A nascent recession and a debt market chill helped to bring 1980s M&A activity to a 
halt and the deployment of judicially sanctioned takeover defenses and the enactment of anti-
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takeover statutes in many states meant hostile bids were particularly hard hit.
83
  There was 
widespread awareness that because the threat of hostile takeovers could discipline wayward 
executives their demise might reduce managerial accountability.
84
  For instance, the 
Washington Post, having noted in a 1990 article that “the takeover artists have all but 
disappeared”, acknowledged there was apprehension “that, without the raiders standing in the 
shadows, a key force has disappeared that had served to keep U.S. business lean, energetic 
and resourceful.”85  Thinking along these lines proved to be a boon for corporate governance 
as attention turned increasingly to the role the board of directors, shareholder activism, 
incentivized executive compensation and related internal governance mechanisms could and 
should play in keeping managers in check.
86
   
The Deal Decade also prompted a rethink of the position of shareholders that 
ultimately would provide an additional boost for corporate governance.  During the heyday of 
managerial capitalism it was widely accepted that public company executives should not treat 
shareholder returns as their sole priority and instead should take into account the interests of 
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employees, consumers and even society at large.
87
  Shareholders similarly were not accorded 
special priority in 1970s debates on corporate governance.  Ralph Nader, Mark Green and 
Joel Seligman’s Taming the Giant Corporation, a 1976 book that offered one of the earliest 
theorizations of corporate governance using that terminology,
 88
 advocated imposing on 
directors oversight responsibilities extending well beyond shareholder interests.
89
  SEC 
chairman Harold Williams indicated that he thought the board of a public company should be 
a guardian not only for the corporation’s stockholders but also the corporation’s long-term 
future and society as a whole.
90
  The proposed Corporate Democracy Act of 1980 contained 
provisions mandating extensive social disclosure by corporations and imposing on directors 
significant responsibilities regarding the formulation of corporate policy toward employees, 
the environment and the community at large.
91
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American Century”, 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 15 (2013):  305, 
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York, 1976), 124-25, 130-31. 
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Board of Directors”, Vital Speeches of the Day, May 15, 1978, 468.  
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  Green et al., Case, pp. 10, 14-15.   
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In contrast with the situation in the 1970s, during the 1980s corporate governance 
became increasingly associated with shareholder returns, which served to fortify its status in a 
market-friendly decade.  Economists, for instance, recoiled from the 1970s version of 
corporate governance as the phrase seemed to have little to do with markets and instead 
implied the corporation was a political structure to be governed.
92
  The situation changed as 
corporate governance became more closely associated with shareholder interests, with many 
economists ultimately equating the term with mechanisms designed to ensure suppliers of 
finance obtained a satisfactory risk-adjusted return on their investment.
93
  This conceptual 
congruence, combined with the linguistic flexibility of the term “corporate governance”, 
fostered its prominence within economic discourse.
94
   
The takeover wave played a prominent role in the reorientation of corporate 
governance around shareholders.  The 1980s surge in the number of hostile bids meant the 
fate of publicly traded companies hinged to an unprecedented degree on shareholder 
perceptions of the capabilities of the incumbent management team.  Assumptions about the 
balance of power between management and stockholders in public companies 
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93
  Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, 
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terms.  See, for example, Marc Goergen, International Corporate Governance (Harlow, 
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correspondingly were modified in the stockholders’ favor.95  Perceptions of corporate 
governance evolved accordingly.   
The association between corporate governance and shareholder value was 
strengthened further as the 1980s drew to a close because institutional shareholders were 
being increasingly drawn into the governance arena.  While the retail investors who 
collectively dominated share ownership during the managerial capitalism era were ill-suited 
to engage in activism, during the 1970s pension funds and mutual funds better situated to 
intervene due to their “power and sophistication” were steadily displacing retail investors as 
share owners.
96
  This trend did not yield radical changes, at least immediately.  Investment 
managers acting on behalf of institutional shareholders feared intervening in the affairs of 
underperforming companies would be a time-consuming activity that was unlikely in the 
event of success to have a significant beneficial impact on a diversified investment 
portfolio.
97
  Regulation also created various obstacles for those institutional investors 
otherwise inclined to engage in activism, such as rules creating an onus to diversify.
98
  The 
Deal Decade, however, would bring at least some institutional shareholders off of the 
governance sidelines.   
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Institutional investors of the 1980s valued the opportunity to sell their stock in 
response to a premium-priced takeover offer.
99
  Correspondingly, when boards concerned 
about possible hostile bids began adopting potent takeover defenses there was shareholder 
pushback.  The battle was an uphill one, particularly given that many states were enacting 
anti-takeover statutes and judges were typically rejecting challenges to managerial defensive 
tactics.
100
  Nevertheless, the initial foray would help to set the stage for further activity.  The 
California Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers), prodded by state treasurer Jesse 
Unruh, was an early and vocal objector to the deployment of takeover defenses and in 1985 
launched an association of public pension funds labelled the Council of Institutional 
Investors.  The Council, which was established to lobby for shareholder rights, would become 
in the 1990s a prestigious corporate governance organization.
101
 
1990s – The Decade of Corporate Governance 
A Financial Times columnist observed in 1999 that “The 1990s have been the decade 
of corporate governance.”102  Given corporate scandals of the early 2000s that would prompt 
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what was for U.S. corporate governance “something like a hundred year flood of reform”103 
such a declaration might seem to have been premature.
104
  On the other hand, it was during 
the 1990s that the term “corporate governance” initially gained prominence internationally.105 
Moreover, in the U.S. expectations rose under the banner of corporate governance that both 
boards and shareholders could and would make a substantial contribution to fostering 
managerial accountability.  
For boards the scene was set because the Penn Central scandal and related 
developments in the 1970s prompted substantial changes to board composition and 
structure.
106
  The proportion of directors of public companies who were at least nominally 
independent of management increased from one-quarter in 1970 to nearly three-fifths in 
1990.
107
  Over the same period, it became the norm for boards to establish and delegate key 
tasks to audit, nomination and compensation committees comprised primarily if not entirely 
by independent directors.
108
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In the early 1990s, dismissals of CEOs at prominent companies such as Goodyear, 
Westinghouse, American Express, General Motors, IBM, and Kodak indicated that at board 
level the substance was matching the form.
109
  The pattern appeared to be sustained through 
the remainder of the decade.  Jay Lorsch, author of a 1989 book on boards entitled Pawns 
and Potentates,
110
 suggested in 2001 that during the 1980s directors “were more like the 
pawns.  Today they are more like the potentates.”111  Law professor Ronald Gilson similarly 
asserted “Directors are now energized.”112 
With shareholders, despite managers of the nation’s pension funds being christened 
“Wall Street’s New Musclemen” in 1989,113 during the 1990s institutional investors generally 
shied away from taking on a substantial “hands on” corporate governance role.114  On the 
other hand, the increased assertiveness by boards at the beginning of the decade resulted at 
least partly from institutional shareholder pressure.
115
  When hostile takeovers subsided 
institutional investors were aware that substitute strategies would likely be needed to foster 
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managerial accountability.
116
  Leaning on boards to keep executives in check was one such 
step.   
Another was pressing for changes to executive pay.  As well as pressuring companies 
to strengthen the independence of compensation committees,
117
 institutional shareholders 
lobbied companies to displace a traditional bias in favor of “pay-for-size” in favor of 
incentive-oriented compensation.
118
  A dramatic surge in the use of equity-based pay – most 
prominently the awarding of stock options – duly increased markedly CEO pay-to-
performance sensitivity and encouraged executives to assimilate the norm that they should 
strive to maximize shareholder value.
119
  The legacy was, however, a problematic one.  When 
the abrupt end of a “dot.com” mania and corporate scandals caused share prices to fall 
precipitously in the early 2000s the dramatic increases in compensation top executives had 
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benefitted from during a 1990s bull market were not reversed, leaving executives open to the 
charge they had manipulated the setting of pay to their own advantage.
120
   
Dramatic changes affecting the managerial function in U.S. public companies also 
contributed to the enhanced profile of corporate governance in the 1990s.  By this point in 
time key precepts of managerial capitalism had been dislodged in a manner that meant 
executives both had a wider opportunity set and greater potential for failure.  Under such 
circumstances, executive performance logically would have mattered more for corporate 
success, meaning in turn that proper functioning of corporate governance should have been a 
higher priority than had previously been the case.   
Deregulation was one trend which enhanced managerial discretion in a manner that 
implied a governance response.  The “regulated capitalism”121 of the 1950s and 1960s was 
characterized not only by governmental setting of prices and standards but also antitrust 
enforcement that essentially precluded horizontal mergers involving firms with a sizeable 
market share.
122
  Deregulation, which commenced during the Jimmy Carter administration 
with the airline and trucking industries, moved into full swing under Ronald Reagan in areas 
such as antitrust and oil and gas and continued in the 1990s with electricity and 
telecommunications.
123
  Deregulation increased the importance of the managerial function in 
firms affected because the unravelling of constraints on pricing, distribution patterns and 
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product innovation created new opportunities to generate profits while the removal of the 
regulatory “safety net” meant substantial downside risk for laggards.124    
Changes in workplace relations also bolstered the latitude executives had.  Union 
membership among private sector workers fell from 35 per cent in the mid-1950s to 15 per 
cent in the mid-1990s and the number of strikes fell dramatically over the same period.
125
  
Correspondingly, while many executives operating during the heyday of managerial 
capitalism had to be mindful of maintaining the goodwill of organized labor their 
counterparts in the 1990s had wide discretion to respond to technological change and 
intensified competition by outsourcing and downsizing.
126
    
A reorientation of corporate finance expanded managerial discretion still further.  
While during the 1950 and 1960s a conservative mind set prevailing among commercial and 
investment banks restricted corporate access to debt finance, substantial liberalization had 
occurred by the 1990s.  Most major investment banks had become publicly traded, ending the 
partner liability regime that had fostered caution, and major commercial banks seeking to 
capture market share in response to deregulation in the banking sector adopted an 
increasingly bold approach to corporate lending.
127
  Companies could also take advantage of 
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a wide range of new debt instruments to finance their existing operations, fresh acquisitions 
and expansion plans.
128
  With increased capacity to borrow,
129
 “(t)he opportunities for 
American executives expanded tremendously.”130   
Improved access to finance could be a curse as well as a blessing for executives, as 
evidenced by the experience of vertically integrated “first movers” that dominated numerous 
key sectors of the U.S. economy when managerial capitalism was at its apex.  Immediately 
following World War II such firms appeared to be unassailable, partly because potential 
upstarts lacked the financial firepower to muster a serious challenge.
131
  By the 1990s, in 
contrast, the erstwhile dominant incumbents, already shaken by surging foreign competition, 
had to deal with new entrants who not only could rely on technological innovation to 
replicate rapidly the specialized resources that had previously provided a decisive 
competitive advantage but could also readily secure funding needed to play “catch up”.132  
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Accordingly, while during the 1960s and 1970s only about 4 per cent of the Fortune 500 
turned over annually 40 per cent of the 1990 Fortune 500 companies were off the list by 
1995.
133
  
The changing circumstances under which executives were operating were heralded 
widely, with books such as The Death of Organization Man,
134
 The Transformation of 
Management
135
 and Welcome to the Revolution
136
 all imparting the message that “being a 
CEO ‘ain’t’ what it used to be.”137  Perceptions of top management changed accordingly.  
The 1990s witnessed the rise of the “imperial” chief executive, with the definition of an 
effective CEO reputedly changing “from that of competent manager to charismatic leader.”138  
For instance, Robert Monks, an early and prominent advocate of robust corporate governance 
who had been member of the board of the conglomerate Tyco, said of chief executive Dennis 
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Kozlowski in a favorable 2001 Business Week profile of Kozlowski entitled “The Most 
Aggressive CEO”, “I don’t think there is a better CEO in America.”139   
A consensus developed that under the new conditions prevailing as the 20
th
 century 
drew to a close CEOs could do more to influence corporate success than used to be the 
case.
140
  This had significant implications for corporate governance because boards and 
shareholders logically would have treated as higher priorities having the right person in 
charge and using compensation arrangements to provide executives with robust incentives to 
perform effectively.  The growing emphasis on linking managerial pay with performance and 
a substantial increase in CEO turnover occurring in the late 1990s
141
 implied there indeed had 
been a meaningful governance response to the new market environment.    
By the end of the 1990s corporate governance had become part of the fabric of 
corporate life in the United States.  Those interested in the topic had a rapidly growing 
literature to which they could refer
142
 and there had been changes on the ground as well.  The 
Economist observed in 1999 that the spate of CEO dismissals that had occurred in the early 
1990s had “change(d) the balance of power between shareholders and boards at big American 
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firms” and suggested “incompetent chief executives in large companies (were) rarer than they 
were in 1990.”143  Economists Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan struck a similar chord in 
a 2001 survey of corporate governance, saying that “since the mid-1980s, the U.S. style of 
corporate governance had reinvented itself” and predicted that “a more market-oriented 
corporate governance than existed up to the early 1980s is here to stay.”144  Corporate 
scandals that were beginning to engulf prominent U.S. corporations at the time would soon 
demonstrate that even though corporate governance had clearly “arrived” in the 1990s the 
arrangements in place were not sufficiently robust to cope with public companies “mass 
producing new Icaran heroes du jour and...giving them the ability to take huge risks almost 
instantly.”145   
The Beginning of the End of the Imperial Chief Executive  
Eighteen months after Business Week published its 2001 profile of Denis Kozlowski 
and less than a year after the same publication named him one of the best 25 managers of the 
year
146
 it ran a cover story entitled “The Rise and Fall of Denis Kozlowski” that, based on 
revelations of egregious misuse of Tyco funds, tax evasion and accounting shenanigans, 
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labelled him “a rogue CEO for the ages.”147  The Tyco scandal had a strong corporate 
governance dimension, in that one director received a sizeable illicit payment from 
Kozlowski and the other directors only belatedly realized “this guy is doing things we don’t 
know about.”148  Tyco was hardly unique.  Lax boardroom oversight also was a feature of 
scandals at Enron and WorldCom that involved senior executives who, being eager to benefit 
from stock options and related forms of incentive-oriented compensation, tried to game the 
accounting numbers to ensure their companies met quarterly earnings targets.
149
   
With “corporate governance” having emerged in the 1990s as the term academics, 
policymakers and investors would most likely deploy when analyzing issues relating to the 
enhancement of managerial accountability, media coverage of and academic research on 
corporate governance jumped sharply as a result of the corporate scandals of the early 
2000s.
150
  The scandals also “marked the beginning of the end of the imperial chief 
executive.”151  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which was the primary regulatory 
response to the scandals, imposed various new governance-related requirements on publicly 
traded companies such as requiring chief executives and chief financial officers of public 
companies to certify the accuracy and completeness of quarterly and annual financial reports 
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and mandating the establishment of audit committees composed entirely of independent 
directors.
152
  The same year the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, at the behest of 
the SEC, promulgated listing rules that required listed companies to have boards with at least 
a majority of independent directors.
153
  One predicted result of the reforms was “Goodbye the 
imperial CEO.”154  This indeed transpired, though only partly due to regulatory change.  
Former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt, writing in 2005, said “Gone are the days of the 
autocratic, muscular CEO whose picture appeared on the covers of business 
magazines….The imperial CEO is no more.”155  Levitt acknowledged the significance of the 
regulatory reforms introduced in the wake of the corporate scandals but said “they are not 
what are driving this shake-up.  Rather we are experiencing a cultural change in America that 
has been building slowly, accelerated by Enron, WorldCom and other corporate debacles.”156  
Others agreed that market developments, including the corporate scandals and the sharp stock 
market correction of the early 2000s, had prompted “a governance revolution.”157  A 2007 
Wall Street Journal article entitled “After the Revolt” cited a “new, post-revolutionary 
generation of power in corporate America” exemplified by CEOs “on shorter leashes, more 
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beholden to their boards of directors.”158  Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve 
of the United States from 1987 to 2006, observed in a 2007 memoir “In the aftermath of the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals, the power of the corporate CEO has been diminished and 
that of the board of directors and shareholders enhanced.”159   
Levitt cited the then recent ousting of CEOs at prominent public companies such as 
AIG, Hewlett-Packard and Disney as evidence in support of his claims concerning the 
reconfiguration of corporate governance in U.S. public companies.
160
  While David Skeel 
expressed concern about “Icaran tendencies” SOX had “left untouched”,161 fiscal prudence 
was another indication the hubris of CEOs was being held in check.  During the mid-2000s 
the balance sheets of large U.S. public companies were in their best shape in decades, due in 
large part to the fact that many such firms treated the paying down of existing debt as a 
priority and generally refrained from engaging in fresh short-term borrowing.
162
  A 40 per 
cent inflation-adjusted decline in the average annual compensation of CEOs of S&P 500 
companies during the 2000s,
163
 albeit following on from the executive pay explosion of the 
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1990s, implied similarly that imperial CEOs were a much less prominent feature of corporate 
America post-Enron.  A dearth of corporate scandals despite a “stress test” in the form of a 
sharp decline in share prices prompted by the financial crisis of 2008-09 further confirmed 
that executives of public companies were more “boring” than they were pre-Enron.164     
Banks Belatedly Become “Boring”165   
While in the wake of the corporate scandals occurring at the beginning of the 2000s 
the imperial CEO was on the run deficient corporate governance at U.S. financial firms was 
cited by numerous observers as a potential cause of the financial crisis afflicting the U.S. in 
2008-09.  There is evidence suggesting that the quality of corporate governance at banks did 
not contribute materially to the onset of the crisis.
166
  On the other hand, in contrast with the 
general trend with post-Enron public companies, domineering proactive top executives such 
as Stan O’Neal (Merrill Lynch), Chuck Prince (Citigroup) and Angelo Mozilo (Countrywide 
Financial) remained a prominent feature throughout the mid-2000s.  Bank boards additionally 
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may have been too complacent about risks powerful and overconfident managers were 
running as the crisis loomed.   
The financial sector delivered strong shareholder returns during the early and mid-
2000s while other firms reeled.  This likely explains why the free-wheeling celebrity CEO 
was tolerated in the banking sector in a way that was out of step with general trends.  Be that 
as it may, the onset of the financial crisis ended whatever corporate governance “free pass” 
banks had enjoyed.  Criticism of executive pay at financial companies quickly mounted, 
shareholder activism became more pronounced and boards dismissed senior executives at a 
rapid clip.   
The pressure on the banks did not let up markedly when the worst of the financial 
crisis was over, and the imperial CEO who featured prominently in leading financial 
companies in the mid-2000s would be a noteworthy casualty.  As the Wall Street Journal said 
in 2013, “Large banks, burned by years of scandal, often with swashbuckling CEOs at the 
helm, are turning to new bosses who sport well-polished veneers of boringness.”167  The 
financial crisis correspondingly proved to be something of a corporate governance equalizer 
for U.S. financial companies.  Post-financial crisis banks were run less flamboyantly than was 
the case immediately prior to the onset of the crisis, much as non-financial companies 
operated in a more restrained way after the corporate scandals and legislative reforms of the 
early 2000s.   
Chronology aside the parallels between banks and non-financial companies were not 
exact.  In the case of non-financial companies pressure from the media and institutional 
shareholders likely did as much as regulation to prompt a shift away from the celebrity CEOs 
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of the 1990s.  Matters were different with the post-financial crisis switch by banks to a more 
“boring” managerial approach.  To the extent that monitoring of senior executives intensified 
the primary catalyst was intervention by regulators such as the Federal Reserve, to which the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 granted new powers to restrain risk-taking by financial 
companies.
168
  Regardless of the precise causes, the imperial CEOs of banks had their wings 
clipped after the financial crisis in a manner similar to non-financial companies post-Enron.   
Activated Shareholders 
While events occurring during the 2000s might have resulted in senior executives 
being less flamboyant than their 1990s counterparts they were simultaneously being put 
under novel pressure from shareholders to refrain from simply standing pat.  Shareholder 
activism conceivably might have been a significant force earlier but, as we have seen, in the 
1990s institutional shareholders generally proved reluctant to step forward.  The 2000s would 
be different, due primarily to hedge funds coming to prominence that specialized in targeting 
underperforming companies and lobbying for changes to boost shareholder returns.
169
  The 
modus operandi of these activist hedge funds was to accumulate quietly a sizeable strategic 
holding, make proposals that management unlock shareholder value by off-loading weak 
divisions, distributing cash to shareholders or selling the company, and then count on support 
from other shareholders to maximize pressure on management.
170
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The 2008-09 financial crisis knocked activist hedge funds off-stride but they came 
back stronger than ever, launching campaigns at more than one-fifth of companies in the S&P 
500 between 2009 and 2014.
171
  Their targets included corporate icons such as Apple, 
Microsoft and PepsiCo.
172
  The fiscal prudence public companies engaged in during the mid-
2000s ironically put them in the activist cross-hairs because a hedge fund could build up a 
stake in a firm with plentiful retained earnings and plausibly demand, as a crusader for 
shareholder rights, that the cash reserves be put to work.
173
    
There is intense debate whether hedge fund activism adds value for shareholders over 
the long haul.
174
  What is clear is that hedge fund activism’s rise to prominence had major 
governance implications.  In a 2010 law review article Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock 
characterized U.S. chief executives as “embattled”, citing hedge fund activism in addition to 
reforms concerning independent directors and executive pay that had caused CEOs to lose 
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power to boards.
175
  The post-financial crisis surge in hedge fund activism disrupted chief 
executives still further, with press reports indicating “the balance of power has shifted…to 
shareholders”176 and that “Corporate America, previously ruled by chief executives and 
boards, is racing to do shareholders’ bidding.”177  Crucially, the mainstream institutional 
shareholders who collectively dominate share ownership proved increasingly willing to back 
hedge fund proposals.
178
  So long as this “happy complementarity”179 continues any sort of 
comeback for the “imperial” CEO is unlikely to be in the cards.   
Conclusion 
While in the U.S. the managerial capitalism era ended at least a couple of decades 
before the 20
th
 century drew to a close, a consensus has yet to emerge on what to call what 
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has replaced it, with contenders including “fiduciary capitalism,”180 “investor capitalism,”181 
and “shareholder capitalism”.182  Regardless of what label ultimately moves to the forefront, 
corporate governance has emerged as a significant feature of this new era, both in terms of 
nomenclature and an increased emphasis on addressing concerns about managerial 
accountability by reference to internal corporate decision-making processes.  The change in 
approach can be explained at least partly by a reconfiguration of the business environment 
affecting executives, directors and shareholders.  The process began in the 1970s as precepts 
underpinning the relatively scandal free system of managerial capitalism that prevailed in the 
1950s and 1960s decreased in relevance.  The politicized version of corporate governance 
that emerged in the 1970s was a poor fit with the market-friendly 1980s but a Deal Decade-
prompted reinvention oriented around promotion of shareholder value changed matters.   
In the 1990s, with chief executives capitalizing on deregulation, changes to labor 
relations and improved access to finance to acquire “imperial” status, increasingly robust 
governance stood out as a potentially beneficial check on managerial hubris.  The 
transformation of corporate governance that was following on from the demise of managerial 
capitalism was, however, not yet complete.  Regulatory and market responses to corporate 
scandals occurring in the early 2000s and, in the case of banks, the 2008-09 financial crisis, 
were needed to call time on the imperial CEO.  A post-financial crisis surge in hedge fund 
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activism confirmed that chief executives would not be returning to their 1990s pedestal any 
time soon.   
Evidence concerning the impact theoretically sound corporate governance has on 
corporate performance is mixed.
183
  Still, while the benefits may be difficult to quantify, there 
can be little doubt that much has changed with U.S. public companies under the mantle of 
corporate governance.  Due to market trends and deregulatory initiatives, senior executives of 
public companies would have as the 20
th
 century drew to a close a much expanded 
opportunity set as compared to their counterparts in the managerial capitalism era.  Corporate 
governance, in the form of more rigorous oversight by boards, a growing emphasis on 
incentivized executive pay and later shareholder activism by hedge funds, functioned as an 
increasingly robust counterweight.  It has even been suggested that “the central problem of 
U.S. corporate law for the last eighty years--the separation of ownership and control--has 
largely been solved.”184  It remains to be seen if this bold prediction is borne out.  Regardless, 
today’s public company executives are clearly facing a considerably different menu list of 
opportunities and constraints than their managerial capitalism era counterparts and the 
growing prominence of corporate governance has contributed substantially to that process.   
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